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Program - Invited speakers

Felicity Deamer and Sam Wilkinson

Department of Philosophy, Durham University, United Kindom

'''Title: Pragmatics, inner speech, and self-knowledge: insights into Auditory Verbal Hallucinations?'''

'''Slides''' : PPTX PDF


How do we come to know our own propositional attitudes? On an anti-introspectionist view, recently defended by appeal to empirical evidence (Carruthers 2006; Gazzaniga 1995; 2000; Gopnik 1993; Wegner 2002; Wilson 2002), but traceable to Gilbert Ryle, self-knowledge for propositional attitudes does not proceed by introspection, but by self-interpretation. In this paper, we explore this suggestion by focusing on the role of inner speech and an overlooked feature of inner speech, namely, the fact that it has, like external, communicative speech, a pragmatics. We show how this accounts for certain features of inner speech, and the role that inner speech plays in generating self-knowledge. We end by showing how this illuminates otherwise perplexing aspects of three phenomena: confabulation in the context of commissurotomy, deficits in self-awareness in autism, and so-called 'Auditory-verbal hallucinations'.

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